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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and performance of 
recipient firms, using of panel of 21,582 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2005. We find 
that joint-ventures perform better than wholly foreign owned and purely domestic firms. 
Although productivity and profitability initially rise with foreign ownership, they start 
declining once foreign ownership reaches beyond 64%. This suggests that some domestic 
ownership is necessary to ensure optimal performance. We rationalize these findings with a 
model of a joint-venture, where strategic interactions between a foreign and a domestic 
owner’s inputs may lead to an inverse U-shaped ownership-performance relationship. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
A vast literature has investigated whether foreign firms perform better than their domestic 
counterparts. Most studies in this literature have partitioned firms into domestic and foreign 
owned and compared the two groups, without assessing whether firms with different degrees of 
foreign ownership perform differently. Our paper fills this gap, by using a panel of 21,582 
unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000-2005 to analyze the exact nature of the 
relationship between the degree of foreign ownership characterizing these firms and their 
performance.  
Focusing on the return on assets, the return on sales, labor productivity, and total factor 
productivity, we find that joint-ventures generally perform better than wholly foreign owned and 
purely domestic firms. This finding is robust to defining joint-ventures on the basis of the capital 
paid in by foreign agents, and on the basis of registration information. It can be explained 
considering that both the domestic and the foreign parties of a joint-venture bring in attributes 
essential to achieving high performance. Specifically, the former contribute knowledge of the 
Chinese market and legal environment, as well as important political connections with local 
governments; and the latter, modern technologies, capital, better corporate governance 
through monitoring and market discipline, and managerial and international networking skills.  
We then investigate the exact nature of the relationship between foreign ownership and 
corporate performance of our Chinese firms, and find that the two variables are linked by an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, corporate performance increases as foreign 
participation rises up to the range 47% to 64%, depending on the measure of performance 
used, and declines thereafter. This suggests a certain degree of domestic ownership is 
necessary to ensure optimal performance. Furthermore, we show that it is those firms owned 
by investors other than those originating from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan that benefit 
most from their foreign ownership.  
Finally, we rationalize these findings with a simple theoretical model of a joint-venture, where, 
under plausible conditions, strategic interactions between the non-contractible inputs 
contributed by a foreign and a domestic owner may lead to a non-monotonic relationship 
between a firm’s degree of foreign ownership and its performance similar to that found in our 
Chinese data. 
Our findings contribute to understanding the link between FDI and economic growth: in 
countries where FDI inflows are large and mainly take the form of joint-ventures between 
domestic and foreign firms, the effect of FDI penetration on the performance of recipient firms 
could be an important channel through which FDI affects economic growth. Attracting more FDI 
in the form of joint-ventures could hence be beneficial to long-run growth. 
1. Introduction 
A vast literature has investigated the effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on 
economic growth reaching a consensus that, especially in developing countries, FDI is 
an engine of growth (see De Mello, 1997, for a survey). Yet, there is still uncertainty 
about the exact ways in which FDI may foster growth. Factors such as knowledge 
spillovers from foreign owned to domestic enterprises or technological upgrading 
could represent possible channels. A wave of papers has tried to measure these 
spillovers by estimating regressions of the productivity of domestic firms on 
alternative indicators of the importance of foreign firms in a given sector. Much of 
this work, however, fails to find evidence of positive spillovers, with some studies 
reporting negative effects (see Blomström and Kokko, 1998; and Görg and 
Greenaway, 2004, for surveys).  
One condition for spillovers to take place is that foreign owned firms are more 
productive than their domestic counterparts. A number of papers within the 
international economics literature, have tested whether or not this is the case, 
obtaining once again, mixed results1 . The issue has also been tackled within the 
privatization literature, which has analyzed the effects of ownership on corporate 
performance in transition economies, including China (see Megginson and Netter, 
2001; and Estrin et al., 2008, for surveys). Although their main focus is generally on 
the effects of state ownership or private ownership, most studies in this literature 
control for foreign ownership, and find that foreign owned firms tend to perform 
better than their domestic counterparts. 
A shortcoming of many of these studies, especially those in the international 
economics literature, is that they simply divide firms into foreign owned and purely 
domestic using some a priori criterion, and compare various measures of firm 
performance across the two groups 2 , ignoring the considerable heterogeneity that 
typically characterizes foreign owned firms. These include wholly foreign owned 
firms, as well as joint-ventures between a domestic and a foreign partner, with 
different degrees of foreign ownership. Joint-ventures represent a popular form of 
                                                 
1 Papers that find little or no evidence of superior performance of foreign owned firms compared to 
their domestic counterparts are Globerman et al. (1994), Griffith (1999a, 1999b), and Benfratello and 
Sembenelli (2006). Papers that find positive evidence are Doms and Jensen (1998), Girma et al. (2001), 
Harris (2002), Harris and Robinson (2003), and Temouri et al. (2008). 
2 For instance, focusing on UK data, Girma et al. (2001) define a firm as foreign owned if the country 
of origin of its ultimate holding company is not the UK. 
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FDI: they account for more than 40% of the foreign affiliates of almost a quarter of 
the respondents to a global survey recently conducted by UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 
2006). Furthermore, based on survey evidence for 1995, Javorcik and Saggi (2004) 
document that in Eastern European countries, which are large FDI recipients, joint-
ventures outnumber direct entries and account for 59% of all projects. Finally, our 
Chinese data show that in 2005, just under half of the foreign owned firms covered 
were joint-ventures. 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1999), Dimelis and Louri (2002), and Takii (2004) are among the few 
who have considered the possibility that firms characterized by different degrees of 
foreign ownership may perform differently. The last four differentiate foreign owned 
firms into a few sub-groups such as minority foreign owned, majority foreign owned, 
and wholly foreign owned. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) make use of Indonesian 
establishments and show that although foreign ownership is always associated with 
higher labor productivity of recipient firms, whether firms are majority or minority 
owned by foreigners does not matter. In contrast, focusing on cross-sectional data for 
Greece, Dimelis and Louri (2002) find that foreign ownership is associated with a 
productivity advantage, which stems from the fully and majority foreign owned firms. 
Chhibber and Majumdar reach a similar conclusion for Indian firms. Finally, Takii 
(2004) shows that wholly foreign owned Indonesian firms tend to be the most 
productive. Aitken and Harrison (1999) go one step further and analyze the extent to 
which the actual degree of foreign equity participation affects performance of 
Venezuelan manufacturing plants. To this end, they estimate a production function 
augmented with a linear term measuring the share of foreign equity participation at 
the plant level, and find a positive coefficient on the latter variable only for small 
plants. Although they do consider that firms with different degrees of foreign 
ownership may perform differently, none of these studies provides a full investigation 
of the exact nature and possible non-monotonicity of the relationship between the 
degree of foreign ownership and corporate performance of recipient firms3.  
                                                 
3 Contrary to the international economics literature, many studies in the privatization literature control 
for the degree of foreign ownership. See, for instance, Konings (2001) who adopts an approach similar 
to Aitken and Harrison’s (1999), and finds that foreign ownership positively affects productivity of 
Polish firms, but not of Bulgarian and Romanian firms. To the best of our knowledge, Djankov (1999) 
is the only study that allows for a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of foreign ownership 
and labor productivity growth in a sample of firms from Georgia, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. Yet, his focus is on enterprise restructuring, rather than corporate 
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Our aim is to provide, for the first time, an in-depth analysis of this 
relationship. For this purpose, we use a panel of 21,582 Chinese unlisted firms 
operating in the entire economy, over the period 2000-2005 4 . The Chinese case 
represents an ideal laboratory for two reasons. First, China is among the top FDI 
recipients in the world. Over the past decade, it has accounted for about one-third of 
gross FDI flows to all emerging markets and about 60% of these flows to Asian 
emerging markets (Prasad and Wei, 2005). Together with a considerable decline in 
the number of state-owned and collective firms, and a rise of privately owned 
enterprises, the increasing number of foreign firms in China has contributed 
dramatically to its changing corporate landscape5. Second, joint-ventures and wholly 
foreign owned firms coexist, which makes a study of the degree of foreign ownership 
on corporate performance particularly relevant6. 
We measure the degree of foreign ownership as the share of a firm’s equity 
owned by foreign investors. We make use of several measures of corporate 
performance and find that joint-ventures generally perform better than wholly foreign 
owned and purely domestic firms. This finding, which is robust to defining the degree 
of foreign ownership on the basis of registration information, can be explained 
considering that both the domestic and the foreign parties of a joint-venture bring in 
attributes essential to achieving high performance. Specifically, the former contribute 
knowledge of the Chinese market and legal environment, as well as important 
political connections with local governments; and the latter, modern technologies, 
capital, better corporate governance through monitoring and market discipline, and 
managerial and international networking skills. We then investigate the exact nature 
                                                                                                                                            
performance. Moreover, he himself admits that his results might not be representative given the small 
number of foreign owned firms in his sample. 
4 Also see Abraham et al. (2007) and Liu (2008) who investigate whether domestic Chinese firms 
benefit from horizontal spillovers from foreign firms, controlling respectively for whether or not firms 
are joint-ventures, and for the percentage of the firms’ equity owned by foreign investors. Neither of 
these studies allows for a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and the 
performance of recipient firms. Another related paper is Du and Girma (2008), who use data for 
Chinese firms to investigate the effects of foreign acquisitions on export markets dynamics. 
5 Specifically, while until 1993, state-owned enterprises still dominated the scenario, in 2005, they 
represented less than 5% of the total number of firms operating in China, while private firms 
represented 73.53%; collective firms, 6.33%; and foreign firms, 15.38% (Guariglia et al., 2008). 
6  In the early days of China’s opening up, foreign agents invested mainly into large and well 
performing state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the form of joint-ventures. Fully foreign owned firms 
were only allowed later. Until 2000, they were required to either provide advanced technology or to be 
primarily export-oriented, and were located mainly in the special economic zones, where they received 
favorable tax treatment, and benefited from streamlined regulations (Dougherty and McGuckin, 2002). 
In recent years, fully foreign owned firms have become increasingly widespread, and joint-ventures 
have more and more frequently become partnerships with private rather than state owned enterprises. 
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of the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate performance of our 
Chinese firms, and find that the two variables are linked by an inverted U-shaped 
relationship: corporate performance initially rises with foreign ownership, but 
declines once foreign ownership reaches beyond 64%. This suggests a certain degree 
of domestic ownership is necessary to ensure optimal performance. Furthermore, we 
show that it is those firms owned by investors other than those originating from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan that benefit most from their foreign ownership.  
To underpin these empirical findings, we construct a simple theoretical model 
of a joint-venture, where a domestic and a foreign owner contribute non-contractible 
inputs to boost the company’s productivity. The choice of the level of such inputs by 
each owner depends on his/her share in the firm’s ownership and profits, as well as on 
the inputs contributed by the other owner. Under plausible conditions, the model 
yields predictions of a non-monotonic relationship between the firm’s degree of 
foreign ownership and its performance similar to that found in our Chinese data. 
Our findings contribute to understanding the link between FDI and economic 
growth: in countries where FDI inflows are large and mainly take the form of joint-
ventures between domestic and foreign firms, the effect of FDI penetration on the 
performance of recipient firms could be an important channel through which FDI 
affects economic growth. Attracting more FDI in the form of joint-ventures could 
hence be beneficial to long-run growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our 
data and present some descriptive statistics. Section 3 illustrates our baseline 
specification and our estimation methodology. Section 4 describes and evaluates our 
regression results. Section 5 presents our theoretical model, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
 
2.1 Data: Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the 
ORIANA database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). 
The database includes balance sheet and profit and loss information for over 23,000 
Chinese companies, over the period 2000-2005. We dropped observations with 
negative sales; as well as observations with negative total assets minus total fixed 
assets and total assets minus liquid assets. Firms that did not have complete records 
on our main regression variables were also dropped. Finally, to control for the 
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potential influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the one percent tails for 
each of our regression variables. Our final dataset covers 21,582 unlisted firms, which 
operate in the entire economy, and corresponds to 91,576 firm-year observations7. 
Our panel is unbalanced, with number of observations ranging from a minimum of 
11,813 in 2000 to a maximum of 17,665 in 20048. 
 As ORIANA does not include complete time-varying ownership information, 
we have augmented it with data on the ownership of industrial firms obtained from 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. Specifically, ownership is defined 
on the basis of the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed each year by six different 
types of investors: the state; foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan); investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; 
individuals; and collective investors. Our foreign ownership variable is given by the 
share of the firm’s capital paid in by all foreign investors, including those from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. We will also provide specifications showing whether the 
effects of ownership by the two groups of foreign investors are different. We will 
verify the robustness of our results to the use of registration-based ownership 
measures. However, defining ownership categories on the basis of the fraction of 
capital paid in by various groups is preferable to using registration codes. The latter 
are in fact updated only with considerable delay (Dollar and Wei, 2007). Moreover, 
firms might have an incentive to falsely register as foreign simply to take advantage 
of the tax benefits accorded to the latter.  
 
2.2 Summary statistics: We divide our observations into four categories on the 
basis of the share of capital paid in by foreign investors 9 . Our first category 
encompasses those firm-years with no foreign participation, which make up 60.95% 
of our sample. Our second category contains those observations with a share of 
foreign capital, which is positive but lower than 50% (10.47% of our sample); our 
                                                 
7 We have excluded listed firms from our analysis as information on their ownership was not available. 
Most of the studies that tried to assess the effects of foreign ownership on firm performance focused on 
the manufacturing sector. In the Chinese context, it is important to consider other sectors as well, as 
non-manufacturing sectors also attract significant levels of foreign investment (see Table A2 in 
Appendix 1C for details). All our results were robust to considering only firms operating in the 
manufacturing sector.  
8 See Appendixes 1A and 1B for details about the structure of our panel, and complete definitions of all 
variables used. 
9 Our observations refer to firm-years. We therefore allow our firms to switch across ownership 
categories each year.  
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third category includes observations with a share higher than or equal to 50% but 
lower than 100%, (8.61% of our sample); our final category contains firms that are 
100% foreign owned, (19.07% of our sample). 
 Our empirical analysis focuses on four measures of corporate performance: the 
Return on Assets (ROA, the ratio of the firm’s net income to total assets); the return 
on sales (ROS, the ratio of the firm’s net income to its total sales); labor productivity 
(PROD, the ratio of the firm’s net income to number of employees); and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP, measured using the Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003, method)10. All 
four have been frequently used in the literature assessing the effects of government 
ownership on corporate performance (Tian and Estrin, 2008; Jiang et al., 2008)11.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics about the behavior of our performance 
variables and other relevant variables for our four categories of ownership12. We can 
see that ROA, ROS, PROD, and TFP, all increase with the degree of foreign 
ownership, but decline for those observations that are 100% foreign owned. This 
suggests that joint-ventures perform better than foreign owned and purely domestic 
firms, and may reflect the fact that both the domestic and the foreign parties of a joint-
venture bring in attributes essential to achieving high performance. Specifically, 
domestic investors have a widespread knowledge of the Chinese markets, and legal 
and political environment, while foreign investors bring in capital, modern 
technologies, better corporate governance through monitoring and market discipline, 
as well as managerial and international networking skills, which together are likely to 
lead to high performance. Foreign ownership is hence beneficial to corporate 
performance only up to a certain threshold beyond which it becomes detrimental. 
Although they exhibit better performance than the purely domestic firms, firms that 
are fully (or almost fully) owned by foreign investors are unlikely to perform as well 
as joint-ventures, due to a limited knowledge of the Chinese market, legal, regulatory, 
                                                 
10 A key issue in the estimation of production functions is the correlation between unobservable 
productivity shocks and input levels. Profit-maximizing firms respond to positive productivity shocks 
by expanding output, which requires additional inputs; and to negative shocks, by decreasing output 
and input usage. Olley and Pakes’ (1996) estimator uses investment as a proxy for these unobservable 
shocks. This could cause problems as any observation with zero investment would have to be dropped 
from the data. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), by contrast, introduce an estimator which uses 
intermediate inputs as proxies, arguing that these (which are generally non-zero) are likely to respond 
more smoothly to productivity shocks. 
11 Jiang et al. (2008) note that in the Chinese context, extraordinary income and income from non-core 
operations may be subject to manipulations: they therefore suggest an alternative measure of corporate 
performance, which excludes them, namely the ratio of operating profits to total assets. All our results 
were robust to using this alternative measure of firm performance. 
12 See Appendix 1C for descriptive statistics of foreign presence by industry and province. 
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and bureaucratic environment, and workers’ attitudes towards incentives, as well as to 
a lack of political connections with local governments (Guanxi), which are often 
considered as a key factor in determining firm performance in China (Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2007). The best performers in the Chinese economy are therefore joint-
ventures with a sufficiently large share of domestic ownership. A minority of these 
joint-ventures are between foreign and state firms. Specifically, those firm-years with 
a positive but lower than 100% share of capital paid in by foreign investors exhibit an 
average share of private capital of 35.74%, and an average share of state capital of 
8.93%. 
Focusing on the other variables reported in Table 1, we see that firm size, 
measured by the logarithm of its total assets, also increases with the degree of foreign 
ownership, and declines for 100% foreign owned firms. Leverage, defined as the ratio 
of the firm’s total liabilities to total assets declines monotonically as the share of 
foreign ownership increases; and collateral, defined as the firm’s ratio of tangible 
fixed assets to total assets, remains approximately constant across the four categories. 
Finally, only 36.7% of the purely domestic firm-years export, while the corresponding 
percentages for joint-ventures and fully foreign owned firm years are, respectively, 
70.7% and 86.0%.  
In the sections that follows, we first formally analyze the extent to which, 
controlling for other relevant variables, the performance of minority foreign-owned, 
majority foreign owned, and fully foreign owned firms differs from that of their 
purely domestic counterparts. We then investigate the exact nature of the relationship 
between foreign ownership and corporate performance. 
 
3. Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
 
3.1 Baseline specifications: We initially estimate the following equation: 
 
(1) PERFit = a0 + a1PERFi(t-1) + a2 Minority foreignit  + a3 Majority foreignit  +  
+ a4 All foreignit + a5 Sizeit + a6 Leverageit + a7 Collateralit + a8 Expdumit +  
+ vi + vt + vjt + eit 
 
where the subscript i indicates firms, and t, time. PERFit indicates in turn our four 
performance indicators. We control for foreign ownership by including the dummy 
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variables Minority foreignit, Majority foreignit, and All Foreignit. Minority foreignit is 
equal to 1 if the share of foreign ownership is positive but lower than 50%, and 0 
otherwise; Majority foreignit is equal to 1 if the share is greater than or equal to 50% 
but lower than 100%, and 0 otherwise; and All Foreignit is equal to 1 if the firm is 
100% foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is a dummy equal to 1 
for purely domestic firms, and 0 otherwise. This exercise is aimed at determining the 
extent to which the performance of fully foreign owned firms and joint-ventures 
characterized by different degrees of foreign participation differs from that of purely 
domestic firms13. 
The other regressors in equation (1) are motivated by the finance literature 
(e.g. McConnel and Servaes, 1990). Size is included to control for the fact, that as 
suggested by Chhibber and Majumdar (1999), larger firms may benefit from 
economies of scale and better access to external finance, which might enhance their 
profitability. Collateralit is expected to affect profitability negatively, as firms with 
more intangible assets are expected to have more investment opportunities and grow 
faster (Tian and Estrin, 2008). Finally, Leverageit is also expected to have a negative 
impact on firm performance, due to the debt overhang problem (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977)14. Because more than 50% of Chinese firms in our sample export, 
we also include a dummy Expdumit, which is equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 0 
otherwise15.  
The error term in equation (1) comprises three components: vi, which is a 
firm-specific component; vt, a time-specific component accounting for possible 
business cycle effects; vjt, a time-specific component which varies across industries, 
accounting for industry-specific shifts in company performance; and eit, an 
idiosyncratic component. We control for vi by estimating our equation in first-
differences; for vt, by including time dummies in all our specifications; and for vjt, by 
including time dummies interacted with industry dummies. 
                                                 
13 It has been argued that comparing foreign firms with all domestic firms may lead to a selection 
problem as domestic firms may include domestic multinationals, which are likely to be as productive as 
foreign multinationals (Criscuolo and Martin, 2005). This is not an issue in the Chinese case 
considering the small size of China’s outward FDI (Morck et al., 2008). 
14 In the presence of a high debt to assets ratio, debt holders will share future investment returns, which 
might lead the firm to forego some profitable investment opportunities. 
15 One could argue that foreign ownership and other firm characteristics affect corporate performance 
with a lag. All our results were robust to using lagged values of our regressors. This also addresses the 
issue of possible reverse causality in the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate 
performance, which is extensively discussed in Section 4.2. 
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 To better understand the nature of the relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm performance, we next estimate the following variant of equation (1), which 
includes the actual percentage of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors, 
Foreigncapit: 
 
(2) PERFit = a0 + a1PERFi(t-1) + a2 Foreigncapit + a3Foreigncap2it + a4 Sizeit +  
+a5 Leverageit + a6 Collateralit + a7Expdumit + a8 Statecapit+  
+ a9 Privatecapit +vi + vt + vjt + eit       
 
Equation (2) includes both Foreigncapit and Foreigncap2it to account for the possible 
non-linearity of the relationship between Foreigncapit and PERFit. Considering the 
large literature on the effects of privatization on corporate performance (Estrin et al., 
2008), the percentage of the firm’s total capital paid in by the state (Statecapit) and by 
private investors (Privatecapit) are also included16. 
 
3.2 Estimation methodology: All equations are estimated in first-differences, to 
control for firm-specific, time-invariant effects. Given possible endogeneity of the 
regressors, we use a first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach17. Two or more lags of each of the regressors are used as instruments.  
To check whether the first-difference GMM estimator is likely to suffer from 
finite sample bias, we compared the GMM and the Within Groups estimates of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in equation (1). Because the Within 
Groups estimate is typically downward biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981), one 
would expect a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
to lie above this. As our GMM coefficient was larger than its Within Groups 
counterpart, we concluded that the first-difference GMM estimates are unlikely to be 
subject to serious finite sample bias18. 
                                                 
16 The squares of these additional variables never had precisely determined coefficients. For this 
reason, we decided to omit them. We also attempted to include cubic terms of all our ownership 
variables, which always had poorly determined coefficients. 
17 See Arellano and Bond (1991) on the application of the GMM approach to panel data. Most of our 
results were robust to using Ordinary Least Squares, which, however, does not take into account 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity of the regressors.  
18 If the estimates obtained using the first-difference GMM estimator lie close or below the Within 
Groups estimates, one could suspect the GMM estimate to be downward biased as well, possibly due to 
weak instruments. In such case, the use of a GMM system estimator (which combines in a system the 
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To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we use the test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals in the 
differenced equation (m2). The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation of the differenced 
residuals, and provides a check on the specification of the model and legitimacy of 
variables dated t-2 as instruments in the differenced equation19.  
 
4. Evaluation of the results 
 
4.1 Are joint-ventures the best performers? Estimates of equation (1) are 
reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table 2, which are respectively based on ROA, ROS, 
PROD, and TFP as measures of corporate performance20. We can see that the lagged 
dependent variable always has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
suggesting persistence. Minority foreign always has a positive and precisely 
determined coefficient, while the coefficient on Majority foreign is also positive but is 
only significant for ROS and TFP. Finally, the coefficient on All Foreign is never 
precisely determined, suggesting that being fully foreign owned is not associated with 
a statistically significant performance advantage. These findings confirm that joint-
ventures generally perform better than purely domestic and purely foreign owned 
firms. Yet, the fact that in two out of four cases, the coefficient associated with 
Majority Foreign is not precisely determined indicates that, as suggested by the 
descriptive statistics in section 2.2, there may be a level of foreign ownership beyond 
which corporate performance starts to decline. Hence, foreign ownership is associated 
with improved firm performance only as long as it is accompanied by a sufficient 
degree of local investors’ participation, without which foreign agents may be unable 
to perform optimally.  
                                                                                                                                            
original specification expressed in first differences and in levels) would be required (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). 
19 If the un-differenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, 
but not second-order serial correlation. Note that the m2 test does not allow to discriminate between 
bad instruments and model specification. As in Benito (2003), we do not rely on the Sargan test (test 
for overidentifying restrictions) because when samples with a very large cross-sectional dimension are 
used in estimation, this test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity (also see 
Blundell et al., 2000). 
20 Note that column 4 of Table 2 contains fewer observations than columns 1 to 3 because TFP is only 
available from 2001 onwards. 
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As for the other regressors included in equation (1), Size is positively and 
significantly associated with ROS and PROD, but negatively associated with TFP. 
Leverage is negatively linked with ROA and ROS, suggesting evidence of debt 
overhang. Collateral has a negative and precisely determined coefficient for ROA and 
TFP, indicating that a relative prevalence of tangible assets in the firm’s capital 
structure may hamper its performance. Finally, our export dummy (Expdum) is 
positively associated with TFP. This is in line with the vast literature, which has 
shown that exporters are typically more productive than non-exporters (see 
Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, for a survey). Yet, surprisingly, Expdum is negatively 
associated with PROD. In all cases, the m2 test does not indicate problems with the 
specification or choice of instruments. 
 
 Next, because our ownership measures based on the share of capital may 
suffer from miscoding problems, we verify the robustness of our results to the use of 
registration-based firm ownership characteristics. In particular, we replace the 
Minority foreign, Majority foreign and All foreign dummies in equation (1) with 
dummies indicating whether, according to its registration code, the firm is a joint-
venture (JV) or fully foreign owned (WFO)21 . Joint-ventures can be either equity 
joint-ventures (EJV) or contractual joint-ventures (CJV). In the case of EJVs, profit, 
control, and risks are divided according to the equity shares invested by the parties. 
On the other hand, the CJV parties’ profit, control, and risks are divided according to 
negotiated contract terms (Folta, 2005). Focusing on these new definitions of foreign 
ownership, 15.95% of our firm-years are made up of equity joint-ventures; 2.78%, by 
contractual joint-ventures; and 17.28%, by wholly foreign owned firms. This leaves 
63.98% of domestically owned firm-years, which compares favorably with the 
corresponding share based on the capital paid in by non foreign agents (60.95%). 
Estimates of equation (1), using registration information are reported in 
columns 5 to 8 of Table 2. In column 5, ROA is used as our measure of corporate 
performance. Column 6 refers to ROS; column 7, to PROD; and column 8, to TFP. 
We can see that the JV dummy always has a positive and strongly significant 
coefficient for all our measures of corporate performance, while the coefficient on the 
WFO dummy is generally smaller and only marginally significant in three out of four 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, using registration-based ownership information does not allow us to differentiate 
between different degrees of foreign ownership in joint-ventures. 
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cases22. In line with Abraham et al. (2007), Yusuf et al. (2006), and Pan et al. (1999), 
these findings indicate that while both joint-ventures and fully foreign owned firms 
perform better than purely domestic firms, the former have a larger advantage. Our 
main result that joint-ventures are top performers in China is therefore robust to using 
registration-based ownership measures. It should be noted, however, that registration-
based measures may be inaccurate, since they are typically updated with significant 
delay, and firms may have incentives to falsely register as foreign to take advantage 
of tax benefits (Dollar and Wei, 2007). 
 
4.2 What is the exact nature of the relationship between the degree foreign 
ownership and corporate performance? Table 3 provides estimates of equation (2), 
which is aimed at better understanding the precise nature of the relationship between 
the degree of foreign ownership and corporate performance. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 
contain estimates respectively for ROA, ROS, PROD, and TFP. In all specifications 
Foreigncap attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient, while 
Foreigncap2 has a negative and precisely determined coefficient. This suggests that 
foreign ownership and corporate performance are linked by an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. The turning points are 47.33% for ROA, 55.23% for ROS, and 58.79% 
for PROD, and 59.54% for TFP: foreign ownership enhances corporate performance 
if it is below these thresholds, and decreases it thereafter. These findings confirm the 
results reported in sections 2.2 and 4.1, which showed that it is partially foreign 
owned firms which are the top performers in the Chinese economy. Foreign 
ownership is associated with improved firm performance only as long as it is 
accompanied by some degree of local investors’ participation: without sufficient 
participation by private agents, foreign investors may be unable to perform optimally.  
Turning to the other control variables, Statecap generally displays a negative 
coefficient, statistically significant for ROA and ROS, which suggests the higher the 
state’s participation in a firm’s capital, the lower its performance. This is consistent 
with the findings in many of the studies on privatization surveyed by Estrin et al. 
(2008). Privatecap, on the other hand, is positively related only with PROD. As in the 
previous specifications, Leverage and Collateral display either negative or poorly 
determined coefficients. Size is positively associated with ROS and PROD, but 
                                                 
22 These results were robust to including two separate dummies for equity joint-ventures (EJV) and 
contractual joint-ventures (CJV). 
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negatively associated with TFP, and Expdum displays a positive and significant 
coefficient in the TFP regression. In none of the specifications does the m2 test 
highlight problems with the specification of the model or the choice of instruments. 
 
As foreign presence typically varies considerably across provinces (see 
Appendix 1C), we next verify whether our estimates of equation (2) are robust to 
replacing the industry dummies interacted with time dummies, with province 
dummies interacted with time dummies 23 . Results are reported in Table 4. Once 
again, Foreigncap has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, while 
Foreigncap2 has a negative and precisely determined coefficient, suggesting an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership and corporate 
performance, with turning points of 52.31%, 64.24%. 55.65%, and 46.79%, 
respectively for ROA, ROS, PROD, and TFP. These turning points are comparable to 
those reported in Table 3. 
 
Our data indicate that the average share of foreign capital paid in by all foreign 
investors is 28.92%. A share of 14.51% is paid in by investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan (HMT), while a share of 14.36% is paid in by other foreign 
investors. It has been argued that although investors from HMT may enjoy an 
advantage based on cultural and geographical proximity to China, they are likely to be 
fundamentally different from investors from other parts of the world. Specifically, it 
may be that investment by HMT firms simply represents “round-tripping” by 
domestic Chinese investors hoping to take advantage of the favorable tax and 
regulatory treatment received by foreign investors (Huang, 2001). In such cases, one 
would not necessarily expect firms owned by investors originating from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan to perform better than domestic firms.  
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix 1D report descriptive statistics similar to those 
presented in Table 1, where observations are partitioned on the basis of the share of 
total capital paid in by investors originating from countries other than HMT, and by 
HMT entrepreneurs, respectively. Like Table 1, Table A3 indicates that corporate 
performance increases with the share of non HMT capital participation, but declines 
for 100% non HMT owned firms. The pattern in Table A4 is less clear, as very little 
                                                 
23 These dummies also control for factors such as the prevalence of foreign owned firms in a given 
province and year. 
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difference in corporate performance is observed among firms with HMT participation 
between 1% and 49.99%, and between 50% and 99.99%. Moreover 100% HMT 
owned firms exhibit the worst performance (column 4). In summary, ownership by 
HMT investors does not seem to lead to a clear-cut productivity advantage: this can be 
seen as indirect evidence in favor of the “round-tripping” hypothesis. 
To shed further light on this issue, we estimate a new version of equation (2), 
in which we replace Foreigncap and Foreigncap2 with corresponding variables for 
non HMT investors (Non HMT Foreigncap and Non HMT Foreigncap2), and HMT 
investors (HMT Foreigncap and HMT Foreigncap2). The estimates are reported in 
Table 5. On the one hand, Non HMT Foreigncap always attracts a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient, while Non HMT Foreigncap2 has a negative and 
precisely determined coefficient. The turning points are 50.00%, 60.68%. 55.03%, 
and 48.73%, respectively for ROA, ROS, PROD, and TFP. These are comparable to 
those reported in Table 3. On the other hand, ownership by investors from HMT has 
less clear-cut effects: the coefficients on both foreign ownership variables are in fact 
poorly determined for TFP, and in the regression for ROA, only the coefficient on 
HMT Foreigncap2 is marginally significant. In the regression for PROD, HMT 
Foreigncap has a significant coefficient, which is much smaller in magnitude 
compared to the corresponding coefficient in Table 3, and HMT Foreigncap2 has a 
negative but marginally significant coefficient. The turning point is 73%. For ROS, 
both the coefficients on HMT Foreigncap and HMT Foreigncap2 are precisely 
determined at conventional levels, and the turning point of 57.85%. In summary, these 
results suggest that the inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership and 
corporate performance is mainly driven by non HMT foreign investors  
 
The use of a GMM estimator, which makes use of lagged values of foreign 
ownership (and other variables) as instruments, ensures in principle that the 
relationship found between foreign ownership and corporate performance is 
essentially explained by the effects of the exogenous component of foreign ownership 
on corporate performance. Yet, it could be argued that if foreign investors target the 
most productive domestic firms, the direction of causality could in fact go from 
corporate performance to the foreign equity share of the firm. To investigate this, we 
perform a panel Granger causality test (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1989). Specifically, we 
estimate an equation of the following type: 
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(3)  Foreigncapit = aoForeigncapi(t-1)+ a1Foreigncapi(t-2)+ b1PERFi(t-1) +  
+ b2PERFi( t-2)+ vi + vt + vjt + eit  
 
where PERF represents in turn one of our four indicators of corporate performance. 
The structure of the error term in equation (3) is similar to that in equations (1) and 
(2). In this framework, PERF is said not to Granger cause Foreigncap if the 
coefficients on PERFi(t-1) and PERFi(t-2) in equation (3) are not significantly different 
from 0, i.e. if b1 = b2 = 0. The results of the estimates of equation (3), together with 
the p-values associated with the F-test aimed at testing our null hypothesis are 
presented in Table 6. We can see that for each of our four measures of corporate 
performance, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. We therefore conclude that there 
is no obvious evidence that corporate performance Granger causes foreign 
ownership24.  
 
Overall, our findings indicate that foreign ownership is only beneficial to the 
performance of Chinese firms, as long as the degree of foreign ownership does not 
pass a certain threshold which ranges between 47% and 64%, depending on the 
measure of corporate performance used. This suggests that a certain degree of 
domestic ownership is necessary to ensure optimal performance. We next construct a 
simple theoretical model aimed at underpinning these empirical findings. 
 
5. Theoretical model 
 
We now construct a simple theoretical model which can generate predictions of a 
non-monotonic relationship between a firm’s degree of foreign ownership and its 
performance similar to that found in the previous section25.  
 
5.1. The model: We assume that the market is made up of I firms labeled with the 
subscript i (i = 1...I), each of which produces a different product, also labeled with i. 
                                                 
24 These results were robust to adding other control variables to the regressions. 
25 Some features of this model resemble the “property rights” approach to the analysis of firm behavior 
pioneered by Hart and Moore (1990) and Grossman and Hart (1986), where business partners choose 
their relation-specific investments on the basis of the allocation of the project’s joint surplus. Also see 
Chapter 5.2 in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2006). We thank Arijit Mukherjee for offering inspiring 
ideas for this section. 
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Let  and  denote the quantity of firm i’s product, and that of a competitively 
supplied numeraire good, respectively. Consumers maximize the following utility 
function: 
iq 0q
(4)   0 , 1,1 i i
0
I
U q q
i
ργ ρ γ= + < >∑=  
Utility maximization yields the following demand curve: 
(5) ( )1,     1,      
1i i i i i
q A p A σσ σ γ ρρ
−= ≡ > ≡− , 
where ip  represents the price of good i, and  is a demand shifter, which is 
exogenous to individual firms. Labor is the only factor of production, and production 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale, with total labor costs given by 
iA
i
i
i
q wc
v
= , 
where w and vi represent respectively the wage (common to all firms) and 
productivity (firm-specific).  
Each firm is potentially a joint-venture between two owners: a foreign (F) and 
a domestic owner (D). Each may contribute a non-contractible input (such as effort) to 
affect the productivity of the joint-venture (vi). Productivity can hence be expressed as 
follows (for simplicity, we hereafter suppress the firm subscript i): 
(6) ( ) ( )v x a y bα β= + +  ,  1,0,0 =+≥≥ βαba . 
x and y represent the non-contractible inputs supplied respectively by F and D. x may 
be interpreted as the foreign owner’s effort aimed at improving the quality of the 
design of the product, or any other form of “knowledge capital”. y could be seen as 
the domestic owner’s effort aimed at promoting the sale and marketing of the product 
in the local market (e.g. through the organization and monitoring of a sales team), or 
at facilitating the political connection (Guanxi) with local governments, which is often 
considered as a key factor in determining firms’ performance in China (Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2007). Both inputs are assumed to be greater than or equal to 0, (i.e. x≥0 and 
y≥0)26. Furthermore, equation (6) implies decreasing returns to scale of x and y (i.e. 
vxx<0, vyy<0)27. 
                                                 
26 This non-negativity assumption means that neither party can contribute negative inputs to incur 
“damage” to the productivity of the joint-venture, by making v fall below its benchmark level given by 
= . )0,0(v βαba
27 As we will show below, this feature will turn out to be crucial for the inverse-U shaped ownership-
productivity relationship that our model predicts under plausible conditions. 
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 The parameter )(βα captures the “relative importance” of the contribution of 
 to productivity. The relative marginal return to x is in fact given by: )(yx
/
/ 1
v x y b
v y x a
α
α
∂ ∂ +=∂ ∂ − + , which is increasing in α . The greater α , the greater the 
contribution of x to firm productivity. In the extreme case in which 0=α , x is 
completely “unimportant” to v, which is purely determined by y.  
The parameter  inversely captures the “absolute indispensability” of x (y): 
the lower a (b), the greater the marginal return to x (y). In the extreme case in which 
(b=0), v=0 if x=0 (y=0), indicating that x (y) is completely “indispensable”, 
since x(y) must be strictly positive in order to achieve a positive productivity.  
)(ba
0=a
We further assume that there are implicit costs borne by each party to increase 
their inputs. These can be expressed as: 
(7) ( )
k
F
rxG x
k
=  ,        ( )
k
D
tyG y
k
= ,  where , . 1k ≥ 0,0 >> tr
Note that these implicit costs are assumed not to be incurred by the joint-venture, but 
only by the individual owners. For example, the domestic party may need to devote 
some of his/her own time to monitor the local sales team, incurring a disutility. 
Finally, the ownership shares of the firm allocated to parties F and D are respectively 
S and 1-S. S is assumed to be exogenous: it could partly depend on the bargaining 
power of the foreign party and on other factors beyond the control of individual 
investors (such as government interventions).  
 
5.2 Nash equilibrium: Each firm’s profit is given by ( )v pq cπ = − . Profit 
maximization leads to the following optimal price: 
( 1)
wp
v
σ
σ= − , which yields the 
following optimal profit:  
(8) 1Bvσπ −=   ,   AB ≡ ( ) -11 --1w σσ σσ σ−    
Parties F and D receive respectively shares S and 1-S of the total profits. Each 
simultaneously chooses the inputs that it contributes to maximize his/her individual 
net payoff, taking the other party’s inputs as given. The two parties’ maximization 
problems can therefore be expressed as follows: 
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(9)    F:      [ ] ( ) 1 1 1max ( , ) ( )        ( )
( 1)
u z
Fx
rS x y G x S x a y b x
B
π α σ
− k− −− ⇔ + + = −   
(10)    D:   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1max 1 ( , ) ( ) 1 ( )
( 1)
u z
Dy
tS x y G y S x a y b y
B
π β σ
k− −⎡ ⎤− − ⇔ − + + =⎣ ⎦ − ,  
where 1 ( 1)z β σ− − ( )1α σ≡ −, u .  ≡
Equations (9) and (10) imply a standard Nash equilibrium problem, whereby each 
party strategically chooses its input, depending on the choice made by the other party. 
For the purpose of the presentation, we will hereafter focus on the simple case in 
which the cost functions of x and y are symmetric ( r t= ) and linear (k=1)28. In this 
case, the equilibrium is determined by:  
(11) ( ) 1 1( )u zS x a y b Qα − 1− −+ + =   
(12)        ( ) 1(1 ) ( )u zS x a y b Qβ − −− + + = ,  
where . To ensure that the second order conditions for each party’s 
optimization problem hold, we assume that 
(1[Q r B σ−≡ − )1 ]
2σ < 29. As shown in figure 1, equations 
(11) and  define y, respectively, as a concave and a convex function of x, ensuring 
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium
(12)
30. The equilibrium values of x and y, x  
and y , are thus given by: 
1
1
(13) 
1 1
2 2 2
1 (1 )
z z
x S S Mσ σ σ
−
− − −= − a−  
(14) 
1 1
2 2 2
1 (1 )
u u
y S S Nσ σ σ
−
− − −= − b− , 
where 1 z zM Qβ α−≡  and . Inspection of these two equations reveals that 
both x
1 u uN β α−≡ Q
1 and y1 are inverse U-shaped functions of S [since 0)(1 <≥∂
∂
S
x
 if S ≤ (>) z and 
0)(1 <≥∂
∂
S
y
 if S≤ (>)u]. Focusing on the relationship between S and x, the intuition 
behind these relationships can be explained considering that, according to the setup of 
our model, an increase in S has two opposing effects on x. On the one hand, when 
                                                 
u α σ− = − − < (1 )( 1) 1 0z
28Although our qualitative results were largely unaffected in more general cases, the example allows us 
to derive simple closed form solutions to the problem. 
29 The second order conditions associated with (11) and (12) are, respectively: 
 and ( )1 1 1 0 α σ− = − − − < . Since 1α < , 2σ <  ensures that both 
of these inequalities hold.  
30 The figure is based on the following parameter values: σ=1.5, α=0.6, r=1, B=10, a=0.05, b=0.08. 
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his/her share in total profit (S) increases, party F tends to provide more input x, as this 
raises the reward to his/her input. We call this the “share effect”. On the other hand, 
an increasing share S means a decreasing share of party D in total profits (1-S), 
leading to a decreasing input from D, which in turn tends to reduce productivity and 
hence total profit. This decreases the marginal return to F’s inputs, and hence induces 
F to provide less input. We call this the “strategic effect”. The overall effect turns out 
to depend on the value of S: when S is low (high), the “share effect” (“strategic 
effect”) dominates, leading to a positive (negative) relationship between S and x. 
Equations (13) and (14) imply that x and y could possibly be negative. Yet, we 
assumed that neither x nor y can take a value below zero (non-negativity assumption). 
It follows that: 
(15)  if , 01 <x 0=x  ⇒ [ ] ( ) 12 arg max (1 ) (0, ) 1 u z
y
y y S y ry S a Q bπ β⎡ ⎤= ≡ − − = − −⎣ ⎦  
(16)    if , 01 <y 0=y  ⇒ [ ] 11 12 arg max ( ,0) z u
x
x x S x rx Sb Qπ α − −⎡ ⎤= ≡ − = −⎣ ⎦ a  
Note that x ( ) is monotonically increasing in S(1-S). Using the non-negativity 
assumption and combining equations 
2 2y
(13) to (16), the equilibrium levels of the inputs 
 and  contributed respectively by F and D are given by : *x *y
                  1( )x S     ,     0,0 11 >> yx
 
(17)                  =*x 2 ( )x S  ,     2 10, 0x y> <
    
                                         0        ,       otherwise 
 
                                        1( )y S  ,         0,0 11 >> yx
   
  (18)                      =*y 2 ( )y S  ,       2 10, 0y x> <
 
                                           0         ,     otherwise  
 
5.3 Relationship between ownership and productivity: We now investigate the 
central issue of the model, i.e. its predictions regarding the relationship between the 
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share of foreign ownership (S) and firm productivity (v*)31. Substituting (17) and (18) 
into (6), we obtain the equilibrium value of productivity as a function of S, i.e.: 
(19)                ( )
1
2
1 1 1( , ) 1v v x y S S Q
βα α β σα β −⎡ ⎤= = −⎣ ⎦                   ,   1 10, 0x y> >
*v =               ( )2 2 2(0, ) ( ) 1 u zv v y a y b a S a Q
β
α β α β⎡ ⎤= = + = −⎣ ⎦    ,    1 20, 0x y< >
                      1 13 2 2( ,0) ( )
z uv v x x a b Sb Q b
α
α β βα − −⎡ ⎤= = + = ⎣ ⎦             ,     1 20, 0y x< >
          4 (0,0)v v a b
α β= =                          ,    otherwise  
From (19), it is straightforward that 1 ( )0v
S
∂ ≥ <∂  if S≤ (>) α. In words, v1 is an inverse 
U-shaped function of S, maximized at S α= . Furthermore, 2 0v
S
∂ <∂ , 
3 0v
S
∂ >∂ , and 
4 0v
S
∂ =∂ . 
What conclusions can we draw from the above analysis about the effects of 
the degree of foreign ownership on owners’ inputs and corporate productivity? As can 
be seen from equations (17)-(19), depending on the model parameters, x*, y*, and v* 
could either be linked to S by an inverted U-shaped relationship, or be monotonically 
increasing or decreasing in S, or be independent of S. This implies that, in general, the 
impact of S on x*, y*, and v* is ambiguous.  
However, under reasonable parameter ranges, the model yields clear-cut 
predictions on the relationship between foreign ownership (S) and firm productivity 
(v*) that broadly fit the empirical results obtained in section 4. Figures 2a and 2b, 
which plot the values of x*, y*, and v* against S, illustrate a situation of this type32. 
The following important features emerge. First, the best performing joint-
venture is more productive than the wholly foreign owned company, which in turn 
outperforms the purely domestic company. This can be expressed as follows:  
(20)   )0(*)1(*)(* vvv >>α  
                                                 
31  These predictions can be generalized to other types of firm performance indicators such as 
profitability (π ), which are monotonically increasing in v* (see equation 8). 
32 Like figure 1, figures 2a and 2b are based on the parameter values: σ=1.5, α=0.6, r=1, B=10, a=0.05, 
b=0.08. Note that v4 does not appear in figure 2b, as it requires that * *x y 0= = , which only occurs 
when both  and are very large. a b
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Note that according to (19) and (13)-(14), 2*(0) (0)v v= , , and 3*(1) (1)v v=
1*( ) ( )v vα α= . As shown in Appendix 2A, it follows that necessary and sufficient 
conditions for (20) are that both a  and b are sufficiently small, and that a is 
sufficiently small relative to b (given ,  and Qα β ). In word, the above pattern of 
productivity ordering requires that both the foreign and domestic party’s inputs are 
crucial to the joint-venture’s productivity performance, with the foreign party’s inputs 
being relatively more important. This is consistent with the fact that, in developing 
countries, the foreign parties of joint-ventures usually provide core technology and 
design of the products, which are often regarded as “key inputs” to production and, 
hence, to productivity. 
Second, for a joint-venture with an intermediate ownership share S (between 
5% and 95% in our example), there exists an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
the share of foreign ownership and productivity, with maximum productivity level at 
α=S . As shown in Appendix 2B, this feature requires that v*(S) is dominated by the 
inverse U-shaped function , which in turn requires that both parameters a and b 
are sufficiently small. To understand the intuition behind this inverse U-shaped 
relationship, it is important to note that the firm’s productivity depends on the joint 
inputs from both parties. As can be seen from figures 2a and 2b, when S is low, the 
input contributed by party F is low, leading to relatively low productivity. Similarly, 
when S is high, party D’s contribution is low, which once again leads to relatively low 
productivity. This is because, as shown in section 5.1, the contributions of inputs x 
and y to overall firm productivity are characterized by decreasing return to scales. 
Hence, a high S (1-S) leads to “undersupply” of input y(x), as the marginal return to 
this input is relatively high, and to “oversupply” of input x (y), whose marginal return 
is low. It is only when S is at an intermediate level, which depends on the relative 
marginal returns of the two inputs, and equals the foreign owner’s share in the 
productivity function (
1( )v S
α ) that the joint inputs contributed by both parties lead to the 
highest productivity of the joint-venture. This result mirrors a well-known conclusion 
from the “property rights” theory of the firm, according to which the optimal 
allocation of property rights should assign more assets to the party whose investment 
has greater impact on production (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990).  
Third, when foreign ownership (S) is very low (high), firm productivity (v*) is 
monotonically decreasing (increasing) in S. This is because, as can be seen from 
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figure 2a, when S is very low (<5% in this example), party F will always provide zero 
inputs, meaning that a marginal increase in S will decrease party D’s share in total 
profits (1-S). This will reduce party D’s incentive to contribute to production (y*), 
leading to a lower level of total productivity. Reasoning analogously, when S is very 
high, party D will always provide zero inputs, whilst party F’s incentive to contribute 
to production will increases in S. Consequently, productivity will increase in S.  
To conclude, although the above theoretical predictions on the relationship 
between ownership and performance depend on model parameters, and in particular 
on the degree of “indispensability” of both parties’ inputs (a, b), the key merit of this 
theoretical model is to provide a rationale for why there could exist a productivity 
ordering between joint-ventures, wholly foreign owned firms, and purely domestic 
firms, and an inverse U-shaped relationship between the degree of foreign ownership 
and corporate performance, similar to those empirically revealed in sections 2 and 4. 
This rationale hinges on the strategic interactions between the owners’ non-
contractible inputs, and the optimal allocation of ownership according to the relative 
importance of each owner’s inputs. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have used a panel of 21,582 unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000-2005 to 
analyze the relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and corporate 
performance. Focusing on the return on assets, the return on sales, labor productivity, 
and TFP, we have found that joint-ventures generally perform better than purely 
foreign owned and purely domestic firms. This finding is robust to defining joint-
ventures on the basis of the capital paid in by various foreign agents, and on the basis 
of registration information. It can be explained considering that both the domestic and 
foreign parties of a joint-venture bring in attributes essential to achieving high 
performance. Specifically, the former contribute knowledge of the Chinese market 
and legal environment, as well as important political connections with local 
governments; and the latter, modern technologies, capital, better corporate governance 
through monitoring and market discipline, and managerial and international 
networking skills. 
We have then shown that foreign ownership and the performance of our 
Chinese firms are linked by an inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, corporate 
performance increases as foreign participation rises up to the range 47% to 64%, 
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depending on the measure of performance used, and declines thereafter. This suggests 
a certain degree of domestic ownership is necessary to ensure optimal performance. 
Furthermore, it is those firms owned by investors other than those originating from 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan that benefit most from their foreign ownership.  
Finally, we have rationalized these results with a simple theoretical model of a 
joint-venture, where, under plausible conditions, strategic interactions between the 
non-contractible inputs contributed by a foreign and a domestic owner may lead to a 
non-monotonic relationship between a firm’s degree of foreign ownership and its 
performance similar to that found in our data. 
Our findings contribute to understanding the link between FDI and economic 
growth: in countries where FDI inflows are large and mainly take the form of joint-
ventures between domestic and foreign firms, the effect of FDI penetration on the 
performance of recipient firms could be an important channel through which FDI 
affects economic growth. Attracting more FDI in the form of joint-ventures could 
hence be beneficial to long-run growth. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Data 
 
A. Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
 
Number of obs. 
per firm 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
2000 11,813 12.77 12.77 
2001 13,864 14.98 27.75 
2002 15,822 17.10 44.84 
2003 16,564 17.90 62.74 
2004 17,665 19.09 81.83 
2005 16,814 18.17 100.00 
Total 91,139 100.00  
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Number of obs. 
per firm 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
1 1,404 1.52 1.52 
2 5,922 6.40 7.92 
3 8,052 8.70 16.62 
4 12,616 13.63 30.25 
5 18,630 20.13 50.38 
6 45,918 49.62 100.00 
Total 91,139 100.00  
 
 
B. Definitions of the variables used 
 
Ownership variables 
Minority foreign: dummy variable (DV) equal to 1 if the share of the firm’s total 
capital owned by foreign investors is positive but lower than 50%, and 0 otherwise.  
Majority foreign: DV equal to 1 if the share of the firm’s total capital owned by 
foreign investors is greater than or equal to 50% but lower than 100%, and 0 
otherwise.  
All foreign: DV equal to 1 if the share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign 
investors is equal to 100%, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreigncap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors (including 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). 
HMT Foreigncap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan. 
Non HMT Foreigncap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors other 
than those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
Statecap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by the state. 
Privatecap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by private investors. 
EJV: DV equal to 1 if the firm is registered as an equity joint-venture (registration 
codes 210 or 310), and 0 otherwise. 
CJV: DV equal to 1 if the firm is registered as a contractual joint-venture (registration 
codes 220 or 320), and 0 otherwise. 
JV: DV equal to 1 if the firm is registered as an EJV or as a CJV, and 0 otherwise. 
WFO: DV equal to 1 if the firm is registered as wholly foreign owned (registration 
codes 230 or 330), and 0 otherwise. 
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Corporate performance variables 
Return on Assets (ROA): ratio of the firm’s net income to total assets. 
Return on Sales (ROS): ratio of the firm’s net income to total sales. 
PROD: labor productivity, calculated as the ratio of the firm’s net income to total 
number of employees. 
TFP: total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method, applied separately to different industrial groups. 
 
Other variables 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where the former include 
tangible, intangible, and other fixed assets; and the latter include inventories, accounts 
receivable, and other current assets. 
Size: logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of current liabilities plus non-current liabilities to total assets, where 
current liabilities include loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities; and 
non-current liabilities include long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Employees: total number of people employed by the firm. 
Expdum: dummy equal to 1 if the firm reports a positive value of firm’s overseas 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using provincial GDP deflators, taken from 
various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
C. FDI patterns by region and industry 
Table A1 shows how our observations are distributed among the four foreign 
ownership categories described in section 2.2, within China’s 30 provinces, which are 
in turn divided into three broad regions (Coastal, Central, and Western)33. We can see 
that most of the foreign owned firm-years are concentrated in the Coastal region, 
where only 50.62% of the firms are domestically owned. The corresponding figures in 
the Central and Western regions are 87.36% and 89.86%, respectively. This 
                                                 
33 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units, which fall into three categories: 22 
provinces or sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Neimenggu, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and 
Guangxi); and 4 municipal cities or zhixiashi, under direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Beijing, and Chongqing). Tibet is excluded from our dataset due to lack of data. 
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geographical concentration of foreign owned firms may have its root in the FDI 
promotion policies adopted in the past, and in the inadequate infrastructures 
characterizing the Central and Western regions (Dougherty and McGuckin, 2002). 
Focusing on specific provinces, Guandong contains the lowest percentage of 
domestically owned firm-years (25.74%), while Qinghai has the highest (98.61%). 
Guandong also contains the highest share of wholly foreign owned firms (52.73%), 
while the highest share of partially foreign owned firms is in Shanghai (34.79%). In 
sum, Table A1 indicates that although all Chinese provinces exhibit some degree of 
foreign ownership, there is a substantial heterogeneity in the degree of foreign 
presence across provinces. 
 Table A2 presents a similar analysis for 15 industrial groups34. 87.90% of our 
sample is made up of manufacturing firm-years. Yet, because foreign ownership also 
characterizes other sectors in the economy, we include some of these in our analysis. 
The Table shows that except for “Mining” and “Transportation; Communication, 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services”, all sectors are characterized by a percentage of 
foreign owned firm-years in excess of 20% 35 . There is also considerable 
heterogeneity in the degree of foreign ownership across sectors. In particular, “Other 
Manufacturing” contains the highest share of wholly foreign owned firm years 
(45.95%)36. The highest percentage of partially foreign owned firm-years is in the 
wholesale and retail sector (30.84%). The Table also shows that foreign firms have 
entered both labor-intensive industries such as “Textiles, Clothing, and Leather”, and 
capital-intensive industries such as “Chemicals, Petroleum, and Man Made Fibres”, 
and “Electrical, Machinery and Computer Equipment”. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 These groups are based on two-digit SIC groups for the manufacturing sector, and on the broader 
SIC divisions for the non-manufacturing sector for which fewer observations are available. 
35 Note that 96.74% of the observations in the broad sector “Transportation, Communication, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services” comes from “Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services”. This broad sector is 
largely controlled by the State. 
36 “Other Manufacturing” contains, among others: measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; 
photographic, medical and optical goods; watches and clocks; jewellery, silverware, and plated ware; 
musical instruments; dolls, toys, games, sporting and athletic goods; pens, pencils and other artists 
materials. 
 27
D. Descriptive statistics differentiating foreign owners into those origination 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those originating from other parts of 
the world 
Table A3 presents descriptive statistics similar to those presented in Table 1 for 
investors originating from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Table A4 presents similar 
statistics from investors originating from other parts of the world. 
 
Appendix 2: Proofs 
 
A. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the productivity ordering 
)0(*)1(*)(* vvv >>α  
From (19), it follows that [ ]2*(0) (0) z zv v a Q
α ββ= = , which is increasing in a; and that 
[ ]1 13*(1) (1) u uv v b Q
β αα− −= = , which is increasing in b. Furthermore, 
1
2 2 2
1*( ) ( )v v Q
α β σα α α β −⎡= = ⎣ ⎤⎦  is independent of a and . Hence, b
*(0) *(1) *( )v v v α< <  requires the following necessary and sufficient conditions to be 
satisfied: 
 
(A.1)       
2 1 12
(1 )1 2 21 2           z u zuz za b Q Q
α βα
z
ββ αα β βμ σ σσα β α β
− ⎛ ⎞ ⎛− − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜−− − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝− −⎡ ⎤< <⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎞⎟⎠    
 
(A.1) implies that for given values of α, β, and Q, both a and b must be sufficiently 
small. Moreover, a must be sufficiently small relative to b, for the inequality chain 
)0(*)1(*)(* vvv >>α  to hold.  
 
B. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the quasi inverse-U shaped 
ownership-productivity relationship 
Recall that  is an inverse U-shaped function of S , while ν1v 2 and ν3 are respectively 
monotonically decreasing and increasing in S, and v4 is independent of S (equation 
19). Let  represent the sets of S that correspond to iΔ ivv =* , { 4,3,2,1 }∈i . For the 
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non-monotonic part ν1 to dominates v*, 1Δ must be large. Note that  should 
satisfy the following conditions: . Using 
1S ∈Δ
1 10  and 0x y> >
1
(13) and (14), these imply: 
(B.1a) 1 2( ) (1 )x z zJ S S S a Mσ− − −≡ − >   
(B.1b) 1 2( ) (1 )y u uJ S S S b Nσ 1− − −≡ − >   
Since 0)()( <≥∂
∂
S
SJ x  if S ≤ (>) z, it can be shown that (B.1a) holds if and only 
if 1 [ , ]
x x x
L HS S∈Δ ≡ S 0, where are such that , 
and 
 x xH LS S> > 2 1( ) , ,x xjJ S a M j H Lσ− −= =
( )0
x x
H LS S
a a
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ < >⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
. This implies that 1
xΔ  increases as  declines.  a
Reasoning analogously, it can be shown that (B.1b) holds if and only if 
, where  are such that , 
and 
1 ,
y y y
L HS S⎡∈Δ ≡ ⎣ S ⎤⎦   0y yH LS S> > 2 1( ) , ,y yjJ S b N j H Lσ− −= =
( )0
y y
H LS S
b b
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ < >⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
. This implies that 1
yΔ  increases as b declines.  
Hence, Δ1 = 1xΔ ∩  will be larger, the smaller a  and b . In other words, the 
more “indispensable” the inputs 
1
yΔ
x  and y  are to the production process, the more the 
relationship between S and v* will be dominated by the inverse U-shaped function v1. 
In the extreme case in which 0== b L L HS S Sa , 0, 1x y x yHS= = = = . This implies that 
, and , i.e. 1 [0,1]Δ = 2 3 4Δ = Δ = Δ =∅ =*v ( )
1
2
1 1v S S Q
βα α β σα β −⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  for . 
This represents a purely inverse U-shaped relationship between v* and S.  
]1,0[∈S
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Figure 1: Nash equilibrium of inputs contributed by foreign and domestic 
owners 
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Figure 2a: Ownership and inputs 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
  
Foreigncap=0% 
 
(1) 
 
 
0%<Foreigncap<50% 
 
(2) 
 
 
50% ≤Foreigncap<100% 
 
(3) 
 
Foreigncap=100% 
 
(4) 
 
ROA 
 
0.037 
 
0.056 
 
0.060 
 
0.046 
ROS 0.025 0.042 0.047 0.032 
PROD 0.058 0.112 0.185 0.091 
TFP 0.027 0.033 0.037 0.028 
     
Size 6.58 6.74 6.83 6.31 
Leverage 0.616 0.595 0.512 0.505 
Collateral 0.398 0.337 0.355 0.360 
Expdum 36.69 70.40 71.10 85.96 
     
Foreigncap 0 27.00 71.06 100 
Statecap 26.16 10.49 7.04 0 
Privatecap 62.27 51.23 16.90 0 
     
Observations 
. 
55817 9584 7884 18291 
 
Notes: Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors. ROA 
represents the firm’s returns to assets and is given by its net income over its total assets. ROS represents 
the firm’s returns to sales and is given by its net income over its total sales. PROD represents labor 
productivity, i.e. the ratio of the firm’s net income to its number of employees. TFP is total factor 
productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. Size is the logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets. Leverage is given by the sum of the firm’s current and non-current liabilities to its 
total assets. Collateral is given by the ratio of the firm’s fixed tangible assets to its total assets. Expdum 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 0 otherwise. Statecap represents the fraction of the firm’s 
capital paid in by the state. Privatecap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by individual 
investors and legal entities. See Appendix 1B for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 2: Are joint-ventures the best performers? 
 
  
ROA 
 
(1) 
 
 
ROS 
 
(2) 
 
PROD 
 
(3) 
 
TFP 
 
(4) 
 
ROA 
 
(5) 
 
ROS 
 
(6) 
 
PROD 
 
(7) 
 
TFP 
 
(8) 
         
Lagged dep. variable 0.386 0.376 0.430 0.197 0.389 0.379 0.421 0.198 
 (21.81)*** (25.26)*** (11.26)*** (4.36)*** (21.77)*** (23.54)*** (11.17)*** (4.72)*** 
         
Minority foreign 0.018 
(1.94)* 
0.023 
(2.91)*** 
0.045 
(2.01)** 
0.008 
(1.93)* 
    
         
Majority foreign 0.017 
(0.81) 
0.037 
(2.10)** 
0.060 
(1.16) 
0.018 
(1.93)* 
    
         
All foreign -0.012 
(0.43) 
0.011 
(0.51) 
-0.017 
(0.27) 
0.015 
(1.32) 
    
         
JV     0.079 
(2.93)*** 
0.090 
(3.89)*** 
0.203 
(3.16)*** 
0.216 
(2.05)** 
         
WFO     0.070 
(1.82)* 
0.080 
(2.43)** 
0.157 
(1.80)* 
0.246 
(1.72)* 
         
Size 0.001 0.012 0.033 -0.009 -0.0002 0.008 0.032 -0.009 
 (0.43) (3.30)*** (3.09)*** (3.23)*** (0.04) (2.16)** (3.05)*** (3.89)*** 
Leverage -0.032 -0.040 0.024 -0.007 -0.036 -0.041 0.015 -0.006 
 (2.74)*** (3.81)*** (0.93) (1.29) (2.96)*** (3.85)*** (0.57) (1.11) 
Collateral -0.042 -0.004 -0.022 -0.013 -0.047 0.005 -0.026 -0.019 
 (3.25)*** (0.31) (0.69) (2.11)** (3.60)*** (0.39) (0.78) (3.22)*** 
Expdum -0.007 -0.018 -0.030 0.005 0.001 -0.012 -0.010 0.007 
 (1.19) (3.19)** (1.90)* (1.80)* (0.17) (1.87)* (0.58) (2.47)** 
         
m2 0.65 -0.09 1.26 1.25 1.27 0.55 1.46 1.43 
Observations 47149 47149 47149 33749 47763 47763 47763 
 
34133 
 
Notes: Minority foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if the share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign investors is positive but 
lower than 50%, and 0 otherwise. Majority foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if the same share is greater than or equal to 50% but 
lower than 100%, and 0 otherwise. All foreign is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the share of the firm’s total capital owned by 
foreign investors is equal to 100%, and 0 otherwise. JV is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is registered as an equity joint-
venture or as a contractual joint-venture, and 0 otherwise. WFO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is registered as wholly 
foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference estimator. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all 
specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The instrument set includes two or 
more lags of all explanatory variables, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2 is a test for second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance: allowing for non-
linearities 
 
  
ROA 
 
(1) 
 
ROS 
 
(2) 
 
PROD 
 
(3) 
 
TFP 
 
(4) 
 
 
Lagged dep. variable 
 
0.378 
 
0.368 
 
0.415 
 
0.214 
 (20.49)*** (23.65)*** (10.40)*** (4.78)*** 
     
Foreigncap 0.142 0.169 0.595 0.057 
 (2.36)** (3.36)*** (3.86)*** (2.21)** 
Foreigncap2 -0.150 -0.153 -0.506 -0.048 
 (3.23)*** (3.88)*** (3.86)*** (2.29)** 
     
Size 0.007 0.013 0.048 -0.007 
 (1.54) (3.59)*** (4.66)*** (2.35)** 
Leverage -0.032 -0.034 -0.008 -0.011 
 (2.32)** (2.77)*** (0.26) (1.86)* 
Collateral -0.053 -0.003 -0.045 -0.014 
 (3.62)*** (0.22) (1.24) (2.31)** 
Expdum -0.005 -0.014 -0.019 0.005 
 (0.71) (2.20)** (1.04) (1.80)* 
Statecap -0.017 -0.018 -0.028 0.004 
 (2.09)** (2.17)** (1.64) (1.09) 
Privatecap 0.000 -0.002 0.041 -0.003 
 (0.05) (0.36) (2.78)*** (0.79) 
     
Turning points 47.33% 55.23% 58.79% 59.54% 
     
m2 0.67 -0.06 1.21 1.20 
Observations 
 
47149 47149 47149 33749 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic t-statistics. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications. 
Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The instrument set includes two or more lags of 
all explanatory variables, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Also see 
Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance: allowing for non-
linearities and including time dummies interacted with provincial dummies 
 
  
ROA 
 
(1) 
 
 
ROS 
 
(2) 
 
PROD 
 
(3) 
 
TFP 
 
(4) 
 
 
Lagged dep. variable 
 
0.371 
 
0.363 
 
0.409 
 
0.174 
 (20.29)*** (23.30)*** (10.23)*** (0.049)*** 
     
Foreigncap 0.136 0.194 0.498 0.049 
 (2.36)** (3.99)*** (3.38)*** (1.93)* 
Foreigncap2 -0.130 -0.151 -0.447 -0.052 
 (2.83)*** (3.79)*** (3.50)*** (2.40)** 
     
Size 0.005 0.012 0.049 -0.012 
 (1.19) (3.10)*** (4.51)*** (3.26)*** 
Leverage -0.028 -0.036 -0.001 -0.006 
 (2.02)** (2.98)*** (0.05) (1.14) 
Collateral -0.061 -0.009 -0.049 -0.014 
 (4.13)*** (0.67) (1.29) (2.11)** 
Expdum -0.002 -0.011 -0.025 0.010 
 (0.34) (1.75)* (1.32) (3.18)*** 
Statecap -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 0.013 
 (2.18)** (2.19)** (0.98) (0.31) 
Privatecap 0.001 0.001 0.042 -0.008 
 (0.08) (0.14) (2.88)*** (2.17)** 
     
Turning points 52.31% 64.24% 55.65% 46.79% 
     
m2 0.82 -0.04 1.21 1.34 
Observations 
 
47349 47349 47349 33749 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic 
t-statistics. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with provincial dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors 
and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The instrument set includes two or more lags of all explanatory 
variables, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with provincial dummies. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Also see Notes to Table 1. 
* indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance: allowing for non-
linearities and distinguishing foreign investors into those originating from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan, and others. 
 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
(1) 
 
 
ROS 
 
(2) 
 
PROD 
 
(3) 
 
TFP 
 
(4) 
     
Lagged dep. var. 0.377 0.366 0.415 0.207 
 (20.41)*** (23.50)*** (10.50)*** (4.63)*** 
     
Non HMT Foreigncap 0.171 
(2.62)*** 
0.172 
(3.06)*** 
0.749 
(4.00)*** 
0.062 
(2.28)** 
Non HMT Foreigncap2 -0.171 
(2.96)*** 
-0.142 
(2.82)** 
-0.680 
(3.87)*** 
-0.064 
(2.65)** 
     
HMT Foreigncap 0.091 
(1.42) 
0.132 
(2.50)*** 
0.330 
(2.02)** 
0.039 
(1.42) 
HMT Foreigncap2 -0.094 
(1.93)* 
-0.114 
(2.84)*** 
-0.226 
(1.70)* 
-0.026 
(1.17) 
     
Size 0.005 0.012 0.045 -0.008 
 (1.30) (3.31)*** (4.36)*** (2.65)** 
Leverage -0.033 -0.036 -0.011 -0.009 
 (2.41)** (2.98)*** (0.36) (1.65) 
Collateral -0.055 -0.005 -0.050 -0.014 
 (3.73)*** (0.40) (1.37) (2.26)** 
Expdum -0.004 -0.012 -0.018 0.005 
 (0.56) (1.94)* (0.96) (1.74)* 
Statecap -0.018 -0.018 -0.030 0.005 
 (2.17)** (2.28)** (1.80) (1.26) 
Privatecap -0.0007 -0.003 0.036 -0.003 
 (0.10) (0.56) (2.48)** (0.94) 
     
Non HMT Foreigncap turning points 50.00% 60.68% 55.03% 48.73% 
HMT Foreigncap turning points - 57.85% 73.00% - 
     
m2 0.77 0.03 1.36 1.51 
Observations 47146 47146 47146 33748 
 
 
Notes: HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan. Non HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors 
other than those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference 
estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The 
instrument set includes two or more lags of all explanatory variables, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 
5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Investigating the reverse causality issue: a Granger causality test 
 
 
Dep.variable: 
Foreigncapit
 
PERFit= ROAit 
 
(1) 
 
 
PERFit= ROSit 
 
(2) 
 
 
PERFit = PRODit 
 
(3) 
 
PERFit = TFPit 
 
(4) 
 
Foreigncapi(t-1)
 
0.544 
(4.91)*** 
 
0.573 
(5.04)*** 
 
0.586 
(5.10)*** 
 
0.755 
(4.80)*** 
     
Foreigncapi(t-2) 0.080 
(2.21)** 
0.088 
(2.37)** 
0.914 
(2.44)** 
0.174 
(2.66)*** 
     
PERFi(t-1) -0.068 
(-1.54) 
-0.034 
(-0.89) 
-0.007 
(-0.25) 
0.0008 
(1.71)* 
     
PERFi(t-2) -0.011 
(-0.51) 
-0.015 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
0.0003 
(2.03)** 
     
Granger causality 
(p-value) 
0.280 0.638 0.969 0.127 
     
m2 0.70 0.61 0.58 - 
Observations 
 
30617 30617 30617 19565 
 
Notes: PERF indicates in turn our 4 performance indicators. All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference 
estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The 
instrument set includes two or more lags of all explanatory variables, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies. The Granger causality test is an F-test aimed at testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the two lags of our 
performance indicators are jointly equal to 0. The m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. This test is not reported in column 4 due to the lack of a 
sufficient number of time series observations. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table A1: Foreign ownership by region 
 
 
Provincename     
 
Foreigncap=0% 
 
(1) 
 
 
0%<Foreigncap<50% 
 
(2) 
 
 
50% ≤ Foreigncap<100% 
 
(3) 
 
Foreigncap=100% 
 
(4) 
 
Coastal 
    
Beijing    54.29129 12.41873 18.98569 14.30429 
Fujian    28.11617 10.25443 11.33385 50.29556 
Guangdong  25.73669 8.540097 12.99393 52.72928 
Hainan    81.36646 3.10559 7.453416 8.074534 
Hebei   82.67504 9.335727 5.116696 2.872531 
Jiangsu   56.70476 14.62857 8.961905 19.70476 
Liaoning 64.70788 8.933424 9.103261 17.25543 
Shandong   71.76608 12.6646 4.870255 10.69907 
Shanghai    34.72512 13.03062 21.76409 30.48017 
Tianjin    46.20075 9.803001 17.72983 26.26642 
Zhejiang   66.229 19.17557 6.045802 8.549619 
Total 50.62489 12.36288 10.44776 26.56447 
     
Central     
Anhui  83.86648 7.649513 3.894298 4.589708 
Heilongjiang   86.46543 5.160662 4.868549 3.505355 
Henan    90.63361 4.683196 3.236915 1.446281 
Hubei    85.53086 6.419753 4.493827 3.555556 
Hunan   87.86181 4.388422 2.894491 4.855276 
Jiangxi   83.26118 7.792208 3.318903 5.627706 
Jilin    81.23711 7.216495 8.556701 2.989691 
Shanxi    92.86182 4.256712 1.899149 .9823183 
Total 87.36165 5.705706 3.921064 3.011583 
     
Western     
Chongqing     86.882 7.119315 4.482532 1.51615 
Gansu  91.27517 6.040268 .8053691 1.879195 
Guangxi    81.02288 7.806191 8.008076 3.162853 
Guizhou    93.19797 3.350254 3.045685 .4060914 
Neimenggu   90.17857 6.760204 1.020408 2.040816 
Ningxia  90.22801 6.514658 3.257329 0 
Qinghai   98.61111 1.388889 0 0 
Shaanxi   91.95711 3.552279 2.613941 1.876676 
Sichuan   91.07827 4.21456 3.475643 1.231527 
Xinjiang    93.5743 2.409639 .4016064 3.614458 
Yunnan   90.96346 4.784053 3.056479 1.196013 
Total 89.86276 
 
5.072409 3.449845 1.614982 
 
Notes: Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors. All numbers in the Table 
are percentages. 
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Table A2: Foreign ownership by industry 
 
 
Industry 
 
Foreigncap=0% 
 
(1) 
 
 
0%<Foreigncap<50% 
 
(2) 
 
 
50% ≤ Foreigncap<100% 
 
(3) 
 
Foreigncap=100% 
 
(4) 
 
Manufacturing 
    
Food, drink, tobacco 65.90055 9.48251 11.63631 12.98063 
Textiles, clothing, leather 50.32337 15.84503 8.81025 25.02135 
Wood, furniture 45.72468 13.4627 9.763493 31.04912 
Paper, printing, publishing 63.06897 11.72414 9.655172 15.55172 
Chemicals, petroleum, man made 
fibres 
64.79431 10.04607 7.64568 17.51394 
Electrical, machinery, computer 
equipment 
49.91 9.286759 10.75487 30.04837 
Stone, clay, glass, concrete products 78.81558 7.352941 7.492051 6.339427 
Metal, metal goods 70.75137 10.31155 5.803299 13.13378 
Transport equipment 70.28352 9.614155 8.015348 12.08698 
Other manufacturing 33.09529 11.11359 9.841554 45.94957 
Total 58.23227 11.03524 8.9767 21.75579 
     
Non manufacturing     
Mining 94.24577 2.990897 .8777633 1.885566 
Construction 50.70422 18.30986 4.225352 26.76056 
Transportation; communication; 
electric, gas, sanitary services 
90.19159 4.269054 3.519367 2.019992 
Wholesale and retail trade 49.6677 13.55782 17.27958 19.49491 
Finance, insurance, real estate, and 
other services 
74.80916 10.1145 5.343512 9.732824 
Total 
 
81.61281 6.31423 5.74021 6.33275 
 
Notes: Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors. All numbers in the Table 
are percentages. 
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Table A3: Summary statistics: partitioning observations on the basis of the degree of 
ownership by investors other than those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
 
 
  
Non HMT 
Foreigncap=0% 
 
(1) 
 
 
0%<non HMT 
Foreigncap<50% 
 
(2) 
 
 
50% ≤non HMT  
Foreigncap<100% 
 
(3) 
 
Non HMT 
Foreigncap=100% 
 
(4) 
 
ROA 
 
0.039 
 
0.061 
 
0.065 
 
0.057 
ROS 0.027 0.047 0.053 0.039 
PROD 0.063 0.13 0.227 0.13 
TFP 0.027 0.035 0.041 0.032 
     
Size 6.51 6.86 7.05 6.54 
Leverage 0.60 0.58 0.51 0.51 
Collateral 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.37 
Expdum 46.59 72.62 71.77 85.77 
     
Non HMT Foreigncap 0 25.96 70.16 100 
HMT Foreigncap 17.93 3.21 0.51 0 
Statecap 20.86 10.40 7.66 0 
Privatecap 51.36 49.47 17.62 0 
     
Observations 
. 
73016 5350 4846 8362 
 
Notes: Non HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors other than those 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Also see Notes to Table 1. See Appendix 1B for complete definitions 
of all variables. Note that column 1 may include observations with positive capital paid in by investors from HMT. 
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Table A4: Summary statistics: partitioning observations on the basis of the degree of 
ownership by investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
 
 
  
HMT 
Foreigncap=0% 
 
(1) 
 
 
0%<HMT 
Foreigncap<50% 
 
(2) 
 
 
50% ≤ HMT 
Foreigncap<100% 
 
(3) 
 
HMT 
Foreigncap=100% 
 
(4) 
 
ROA 
 
0.042 
 
0.051 
 
0.052 
 
0.037 
ROS 0.030 0.039 0.037 0.026 
PROD 0.081 0.11 0.116 0.060 
TFP 0.029 0.033 0.031 0.025 
     
Size 6.61 6.77 6.46 6.10 
Leverage 0.59 0.60 0.52 0.50 
Collateral 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.35 
Expdum 46.73 69.31 70.71 86.16 
     
HMT Foreigncap 0 25.05 72.21 100 
Non HMT Foreigncap 17.57 3.90 0.90 0 
Statecap 20.97 10.88 5.75 0 
Privatecap 51.63 4.55 14.73 0 
     
Observations 
. 
73521 5224 3063 9766 
 
Notes: HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan. Non HMT Foreigncap represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors 
other than those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Also see Notes to Table 1. See Appendix 1B for complete 
definitions of all variables. Note that column 1 may include observations with positive capital paid in by investors other 
than those from HMT. 
 
